“Others” in the Ukrainian Society as a Result of the Modern Russian-Ukrainian War

By Tetiana Poiarkova*

Abstract
The article is devoted to the usage of identification processes as means of struggle with enemies during “the new wars”. The meaning of the notion “others” is distinguished through the analysis of such definitions as “others/their our” (“other out-group” and “other in-group”) and “others/outsiders”. The actual problems of “the others” for contemporary Ukraine, caused by significant transformations due to Russian aggression which has been lasting since 2014, are shown. Russia-Ukrainian military conflict is an example of a “new war’s” means that ruins a state not only inside but outside. The Russian Federation is depicted using controlled identification processes in the occupied Crimea and so-called LPR-DPR that, in future, may work against Ukraine. The main attention is paid to the difference, basis and directions of forced migrations in the Crimea and the LPR-DPR which were made by the RF. It is determined that in the Crimea the RF actively changes the demographic situation in the Crimea by: 1) forcing the Crimean Tatar population to leave; 2) substituting the Crimean political elite by migrants from continental Russia; 3) populating the territory by Russian servicemen. In contrast to the Crimea, demographic policy of the RF in the LPR-DPR is of temporary character and is directed to the accommodation either of servicemen or the RF’s mercenaries in order to take part in the war. After accomplishing their mission, they will return to the RF. The author analyses the practice of “society compaction” in the LPR-DPR as the means to change the local population into “others/outsiders” for the RF as well as for Ukraine.

Keywords: otherness, otherness, other out-group, other in-group, others/outsiders, others/their our

1. Introduction

“Otherness” is the notion that has significant meaningful versatility and includes many definitions varying from the symptom of personality’s top individualization to characteristics of society in the epoch of globalization. In such a contextual diversity, there is a common approach that considers otherness to be a continual search of community in society, but demands to identify peculiarities of some members which are representatives of different cultures and members of the same society at the same time.

2. Materials and Methods

B. Latour in his work “Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory” remarked that “correlation with a certain group is a permanent process made of specific fragile controversial relations which are constantly changing”1. At the same time, this process – from the appearance as a social phenomenon up to the moment


| *Professor of political science. Departments of Political Science of the Faculty of History and Philosophy at the Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University. |
of turning into a different quality – actualises the point of the appearance of “others” in the society. According to B. Latour establishment of the point of genesis for a new social group is the declaration of symbolic projection’s existence as a “social context”, which having such cause-and-effect relations can be used for the explanation of different aspects of reality.

To achieve this, as B. Latour thinks, it is necessary to concentrate the attention on the fact that evolution of different social groups should be analysed considering, first of all, “social time” which influences the essence and matter of social relations being formed in the frames of particular social groups and between them. Secondly, it should be taken into consideration “connection to the landscape” where patterns and agents swirl.

B. Latour’s remark that social context as a kind of social relations reveals by means of “antigroup” category and comparing with other competitive relations is the basis for shaping of social “otherness”.

So, Z. Bauman in his work “Individualized Society” sees the reasons of the appearance of such apolitical problem as “others” in globalization that changes completely the conception of environment and substantially transforms social relationship and, correspondingly, conception of social context (Bauman 2005). In addition to that, migrations are the factor which causes the split of social unity, stipulated by the lack of environmental limits for the rich comparing with the poor, and also leads to the split of social time unity. The result of this is the differentiation between the concepts concerning reasons and necessities of joint actions on the background of detriment to influence of common political actions.

In this context, it is important to mention S. Benhabib’s statement, given in his work “The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era”, that accentuates “otherness” as a cultural estimation which “is always the mark of social differentiation”. The author thinks this to be natural because each person identifies himself with a certain social group and doesn’t reduce his individual mind to standard behaviour of group identity. From this point of view, separation of “otherness” is the process of institutionalization of cultural groups and is a potential threat to the reproduction of system.

It is connected with the fact that social time depends on subjective will (Romashov 2020). On one hand, this makes the sense of time in society vulnerable because of outer expansion into the system of social vital activity that leads to destruction. On the other hand, this feature stimulates progressive tendencies which may lead to the improvement of life not only for a person but for the whole society.

Thus, the social time is a changeable category which, depending on the circumstances, may have a progressive development as well as regressive one. Because of this “otherness” becomes the antipode to the connectedness into a single whole where the differences are based on the “division into friendly and alien as the actualization of the necessity “to bring aliens to reason as unsought guests”.

---

2 Ibid. p. 31–32, 15.
3 Ibid. p. 274, 308.
4 Ibid. p. 54.
6 Ibid. p. 49–50, 63.
Grounding of the notion of “otherness” by means of differentiation in definitions for terms “alien” and “friendly”, where “alienness” is presented as the absence of general responses to system’s challenges threatening to the reproduction of system, was made by B. Valdenfels in his work “Phenomenology of the Alien: Basic Concepts (Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy)”\(^8\). Here, the notion “otherness” gains two meanings, the first one is beyond the limits of normal/abnormal everyday life of “friendly”, while the other one presents “other” as a sort of “alien”, which is dangerous for everybody’s life\(^9\).

The similar approach to understanding of the nature of “otherness” is seen in attempts to determine the degree of “alienness” by means of dividing into “other in-group” and “others out-group”. Here the “otherness” becomes apparent by means of integration in associations “someone different” or “others within these associations, that further causes the creation of new relations or a net.

Moreover, “others out-group” are would-be dangerous, when danger and fear of them become factors-transformers of social life, as they change not only forms of unity but the basis of political subjectivity. From this viewpoint, group-making is based on the ruining of other groups and separation from the previous ones due to their completely different explanation of their actions and actions of other groups.

This is just the idea to study the asymmetry between western discourses and realities of non-western world in the work “Politics of the «Other» in India and China. Western Concepts in Non-Western Contexts” (Koenig & Chaudhuri 2016 (Ed.)).

“Others in-group” are such groups in society which have difference of wide spectrum from physical (race, gender, sexual orientation) to cultural (religion, belief, traditions, values, etc.). To our mind, among the first works having paid attention to this kind of “otherness” are such works as “Black Skin, White Masks” and “Other sex” (Fanon 1952; Beauvoir & Parshley 1952). In time the notion of “others in-group” were enriched with the substitution of social connection by surrogates appearing in the result of migration spreading, authoritarianism of ruling circles and social isolation of migrants (e.g. Lianos 2016).

Gradually, denotations of “otherness” were made more exact and divaricated into such categories as “others/outsiders” and “others/our”. Thus, J. Staszak in the work “International Encyclopedia of Human Geography” states that “others/our” appeared in inside of the group as the result of their loss of identity or a conflict of stereotypes in the cases when such facts become evident: 1) difference in identity between dominating group and basic one; 2) opposition within the ruling class (Staszak 2008). The category of “others/outsiders” is the identity based on the correlation of quality not only of alien environment (civilized, more fair, etc) but also the other time (more modern, newer).

3. Discussion

For contemporary Ukraine the problem of “others” is of great urgency in the context of modern Russian-Ukrainian war that leads to substantial social transformations because of the Crimea annexation, control over so-called LPR-DPR, appearance of inner

\(^9\) Ibid. p. 67, 102.
migration of refugees and displaced people.

To our mind, taking these socio-political processes into consideration may be an expressive confirmation of the fact that current confrontation between Ukraine and the RF can be regarded as a kind of war characterized by, ex acte, some synonymous conception such as “post-industrial war”, “conflict of low intensity”, “new civil war”, “hybrid war”, “neoconventional war”, etc.

But their common component is the recognition of the fact that, firstly, such military conflicts fix changes in recognition of war as an event in time space. D. Singer in the work «Correlates of War» studies war as a conflict continuing more than a year and has more than 1000 casualties (Singer 1972). Secondly, modern wars demonstrate ruining of fundamental principles of national state organization on supranational and world level. Having been lain after the Second World War they are now outmoded because of technical progress, global westernization and appearance of new powerful economic centres (e.g. Maklyuen & Fiore 2013).

At the same time, along with common components there are differences in understanding of modern military conflicts. On one hand, they are treated as appearing in the result of state’s decline. On the other hand, they are positioned as a proper means of destruction by other or others states.

In this context, the attention should be paid to M. Kaldor’s work “New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era” in which “new wars” are treated as opposite to usual (conventional) wars being waged for saving and assertion of identity (nationalism, patriotism), ideas (national interest) and ideology (liberalism, socialism or fascism). The author sees the reason of the appearance of “new wars” in decline (or disintegration) of a state as a legal institution of violence, connecting such an opinion with: 1) increase in state’s disability to solve its own problems, such as to establish norms of defence, collective guarantees, ethnic principles, models of justice; 2) deepening of precipice between the private and the public in the result of economic decline, spreading of crimes, corruption, reduction in state income, etc.10

In contrast to mentioned above approach there are scientific intelligence services in which wars of post-industrial time are seen as a means of state ruining (Tilli 2009; Toffler 1993; Kreveld 1991). Thus, M. van Kreveld sees the reason of this in recession from Westphalian peace treaty of 1648 that led to the blurring of borders between the private and the public, government and people, military men and civic population, etc.11 All this leads to the loss of conceptual unambiguity while determining a victim and aggressor, that, in its term, stipulates for the ruining of conception as to the necessity to defend civilian population and principles of Geneva Convention concerning the defence of victims of war, especially of Part III “Occupied territories”, according to which state-aggressor is responsible for the population in occupied territory.

It is important to emphasize that two different views on the nature of “new wars” are in assertion of their common features. So, violence isn’t state’s monopoly, that leads to: 1) increase in violence through different combinations of state and non-state networks; 2) appearance of different kinds of combat subunits (both state and private ones) and, as a

result, disability to mark off combatants and noncombatants such as partisan detachments, in other words, people who lead peaceful life during the daytime, but at night they are at war; 3) attempts to gain political, not physical, control over population by means of intimidation and terrorizing; 4) increase in non-state sponsors interested in implementation of violence; 5) increase in death-toll among civilian population; 6) increase in crimes committed by retired military men comparing to civil people contrary to international law.

Along with this appeal to high technologies is concentrated in information sphere with the specific aim: to collect military intelligence information or to recode and prepare civilian population’s consciousness to a conflict. Thus, a modern aggressor, using up-to-date technologies and social networks, makes his attractive image directed to the mobilization of support in diaspora, authorities, religious groups, private donors and foreigners. On the basis of such actions, the aggressor gains foreign help, including external subvention as a help of interested countries, international humanitarian assistance to local population that is based on ideology, religious and ethnic beliefs, etc. Precisely for this reason, activities of international organizations, founded on international law, have a converse effect in such military conflicts.

Among the specific marks of “new wars” is the implementation of such tactics as “mopping-up of the territory” with the help of mass expatriation of population and forming of completely controlled society on the territories under control. Such tactics ensure the achievement of strategic objectives which are in ruining of enemy state not only by means of military actions but also establishing the whole economic control over the territory.

There are different means to achieve mentioned above aims, such as: 1) to rob those who don’t support conquerors; 2) to remove dismantled equipment to the territory under control; 3) usurpation of dwellings; 4) defalcation of income from smuggling; 5) destructive usage of natural resources; 6) kidnapping; 7) making of shadow market of smuggled drugs, slavery, prostitution, etc.

Among the military methods of warfare is also the forming of demographic wave that potentially becomes the means to ruining a victim state, as “… migrations can transform the system of international relations into new environment not coinciding with national borders”¹². There are also such traditional means to make people migrate as murders, rapes, taking of property from a person, depriving of medical aid, refusal to give a job due to such identifying discordances as nationality, religion, language, political views, etc.

At the same time it should be taken into consideration that ruining of state takes place not only outside but also from the inside of the country. The experience of such wars (e.g. Syria) shows that one of the means to wage “new wars” is the division of citizens, having appeared on seized territories or are forced to migrate, into “friendly” and “alien” with the simultaneous calibration of “others” into “others-outsiders” and “others/their our” (Melantowicz 2013).

The connection between the dynamics of social vital functions and continuous changing of reality causes the necessity to take into consideration the nature, essence and constituents of Russian-Ukrainian war and proves that the RF actively uses the technology

of transformation of “others” in Ukrainian society into “Russian-friendly” but “Ukrainian-alien”. But this practice differs in some ways in the Crimea and occupied territories of Donetsk and Lugansk regions.

As to Ukraine, the RF started the social division from occupation of the Crimea, in the result of which not only separate people but whole groups, organizations and structures came over to enemy’s side. Such a conversion led to the fact that still before the beginning of the warfare the RF controlled key posts not only in power structure of Ukrainian state (e.g. practically the whole staff of The Crimean Security Service came over to aggressor’s side during the annexation of the Crimea) but in non-state influential organizations (such as Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate). It is rather demonstrative that illegal occupation was supported by broad masses of Crimean population, demonstrating the “otherness” concerning the citizens of continental Ukraine and categorical aversion of Maidan events.

The further events in the Crimea demonstrated Ukrainians the division into “others/their own” – refugees to continental Ukraine, and “others-outsiders” – those who remained to live in the Crimea.

The group of “others-outsiders” (those who support the transition under the RF’s control) includes: 1) military men and employees of powerful structures, who betrayed Ukrainian people; 2) chiefs of all levels and representatives of local elite; 3) teachers and tutors who remained to teach according to the RF’s standards and demands.

An additional means to deepen the split between “the friendly” and “the alien” is total militarisation of education on occupied territories. Due to this fact inconsistent value are often widespread: soviet attributes are combined with the nostalgia for the Russian Empire, the image of Stalin – the saviour of homeland goes together with the domination of Orthodox Church (Russian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate), etc.

But it is necessary to say that in the Crimea Russia sees Crimean Tatar population as “the aliens” in the local society. To prove this different means are used, the most influential one among them is accusing of terrorist activities (e.g. support of world terrorist organizations such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir).

At the same time, the RF conducts active political actions on order to change the demographic composition in the Crimea. Firstly, it is the settlement of military men and their families. Secondly, it is the migration from the continental part of the country. It should be mentioned that such actions of the RF face natural resistance to the forced migration pressure from the regional (Crimean) identity. This inner division into “friendly – Crimeans” and “aliens – those who came” – distinctly shows the difference between the Crimean area and the RF as a whole.

Nevertheless, Russian planned actions as to the correlation of demographic composition in the Crimea challenge the natural resistance of local society to forcible migration pressure that, in its turn, becomes the basis for retention of basic (regional) identity. So, according to the data of the social study conducted by Russia centre “Open Opinion” Crimean space greatly differs in identification marks from all Russian territory\(13\). For example, as distinct from Russian regions, every third citizen of the peninsula prefers to be “a Crimean inhabitant” (35%), when in the RF regional identity is found only among 9% of

\(13\) Brief analytical report on the results of the study “Open Opinion - Crimea” (2016).
interrogators. In the Crimea less than half of interrogators (43%) consider themselves “citizens of Russia” that differs from the reality of Russian regions, where the same point was chosen by 55% of respondents. It is demonstrative that in the Crimea about 9% of residents chose the point “citizen of the world, inhabitant of the Earth”. In the situation, where distinct correlation of respondent with ‘citizen of Ukraine” is undesirable, residents of the Crimea in such a way underline their difference in the frames of Russia reality. Thus in the report it is said that among the Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and representatives of other nationalities the amount of respondents with cosmopolitan self-identification is bigger – 11-15%. In edition, among the Crimean Ukrainians only 28% consider themselves “citizens of Russia”.

In so called LPR-DPR there is a bit different situation with identification processes that is directly connected with previous history in these regions and active warfare on the territories under their control.

In this context, it should be taken into consideration that before the beginning of modern Russian-Ukrainian war Dondas (as the area of Donetsk and Lugansk regions) had already been positioned as “other” among the rest of Ukrainian regions. Moreover, this “otherness” was based on: 1) durative imperial policy of crowding the region with cheap labour force due to engaging of Russians from central regions of the RF and simultaneous displacement of local Ukrainian population; 2) soviet industrial exploration of territories making closed-loop industrial and cultural circuit with such obligatory components as: home, job, consumer services, culture establishments; 3) research and educational institutions that maintain the regional industry.

In addition, the war completely changes and transforms this regional “otherness”. Thus, on one hand, this region became the source of the most powerful demographic wave in the form of “forced migrants” to central Ukraine, the majority of whom were intellectuals (doctors, scientist) and highly skilled workers. On the other hand, these “others/our” are gradually falling within the further identifying differentiation directly connected both with the great amount of “inner migrants” (nearly 2 million people) and imminent belaying of negative image on the bases of generalization of such feature as disability to defend their region’s independence and making additional budgetary spending.

The war with Russia also corrects the determination of “others/outsiders” among the citizens of so-called LPR-DPR by adding: 1) combatants who are former migrants (the unemployed, low-skilled workers, the convicted, etc.); 2) criminals living at the expense of kickback, debt collecting, trafficking and opportunity to occupy dwellings left by refugees; 3) migrants to the RF among whom there are a lot of skilled workers (and their families) from the enterprises having been robbed, dismantled and removed to the RF; 4) functionaries of all levels in so-called new republics; 5) teachers and tutors who teach using programmes and textbooks of the RF; 6) social sphere employees.

This “otherness/outsiderness” is formed on the basis of such negative phenomena as: accepting of violence as the norm, neglect of human being’s value, neglect of environmental safety, extreme consumerism (as simultaneous combination of demanding of pensions from Ukraine and dreams of living in the RF). This supports the RF’s control over education (not only on occupied territories but in the Crimea), proclaimed as renovation of cultural and civilized environment of “Russian World” based on traditional
religious, social, cultural and ethical values with the perspective to enter into the Great Russia as the halo of territories of “Russian World”.

To understand the forming of identification fractures due to the Russian-Ukrainian war is impossible without taking into consideration the fact that inside the so-called LPR-DPR groups of “others/outsiders”, concerning not only the RF but also Ukraine, are being formed. Uniting substratum for consolidation of those who have left is the contrasting of local population to Russians as to the citizens of superior grade. The catalyst of this process is disability to come back to pre-war life for those local people who supported the RF and took an active part in warfare against the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

This group can be added by such people as those who to receive a profit from Ukrainian and Russian states that means to receive pensions and social payments from both countries or to have profit from difference in prices in central Ukraine and occupied territories, from providing services in preparing documents of the RF and Ukraine. “Estrangement” of the RF for these groups is strengthened by the opportunity to monetize the image of warfare victims into humanitarian aid or address payments.

At the territory of so called LPR-DPR the situation with migration processes is a bit different that is directly connected with warfare. So, on one side, this region is the source of very powerful demographic wave in the form of “forced migrants”. On the other side, LPR-DPR are the last point of migration movement from the RF, where Russian manhood arrived to conduct warfare, become the compensatory substitute of demographic decrease of population. The significant segment consisting of so called unaccounted “volunteers” – “retirees”/“soldiers on leave”, who represent different non-state paramilitary formations of Russian citizens, should be taken into account. A peculiarity of this demographic vector is high turnover of staff, lack of highly skilled specialists and the priority of monetary reward over motivation.

4. Results

As we can see, the temporary (circular) character of war troops’ stay at Ukrainian occupied territories is general for demographic movement (of servicemen and volunteers) and implies the inevitability of return to the RF.

Nonetheless, there are groups of people, who potentially pretend to settle for a long time in the region. It is obvious that demographic gaps of LPR-DPR are filled by Russian migrants coming from the RF. They make groups of armed businessmen, the source of existence of which is getting of kickbacks, collection of debts, human trafficking. An impotent fact is an opportunity to occupy dwelling left by refugees. All these in the whole make a halo of attractiveness not only for marginal Russian societies, which didn’t find a place for them in Russia, but for Russian servicemen, who don’t want to continue their contract service in Russian army and plan to live at the territory of LPR-DPR in future.

As in the Crimea, migration pressure of the RF is the reason for LPR-DPR’s society’s “compaction”. All these are catalyzed by the planned disassembling of industrial enterprises at the territory of LPR-DPR. Transportation of the most successful productions to Russia is accompanied by the corresponding migration of these enterprises’ workers (often with their families).

Coal-mining industry faces more dramatic situation. Abolishment of mines stipulates for
the new division of labour for high-skilled workers and they strengthen the troops combating against Ukraine and explain their choice by the need to give the support for their families. We may only guess about the scale of this phenomenon. Here, the attendant aggressive competition for the rest of resources, at the background of the decline of local oligarchs’ influence (because of disassembling of backbone enterprises), only speeds up the process of LPR-DPR people’s alienation from Russia and Ukraine. Thus, the total reduction in the amount of those, who has left this region (integration of demographic resource), leads to unity of those who remain. This event is speeded up by several simultaneous processes. Firstly, it is the positioning of Russian people as the citizens of first quality (with higher salaries and opportunity to return home to quiet Russia). Secondly, the strengthening factor is the threat for local residents, who supported the RF and took an active part in the warfare against the Armed Forces of Ukraine using forbidden weapon and breaking all the norms of warfare conducting and upkeep of prisoners of war, to be imprisoned for separatism. All mentioned above is influenced by the competition between Russian power structures inside the RF (e.g. Federal Security Service and Main intelligence directorate of the Russian General Staff), and LPR-DPR are treated as the catalyst in winner determining. In this situation the local population plays the role of the battle royal.

In other words, in occupied enclaves the division on “we” and “they” occurs as along the line of fallout of the control of Ukrainian state and Ukrainian social hierarchy as along the line of “non-coming” into Russian society. Along these lines the introduction of their own passports and license plates, which are not recognized anywhere in the world but play the identification role for “friends”, is demonstrative for LPR-DPR. In the Crimea this process isn’t so evident and there is a desire to explain all the difficulties connected with entering the RF by the actions of the elite remained from Ukraine.

To our mind, in order to completely depict the influence of Russian-Ukrainian conflict on processes of identification in whole and on the separation of “others” in particular it is necessary to consider the practice begun after V. Zelensky’s team had won the elections. Its essence is in transformation of active population (volunteers, ATO and Joint Forces Operation participants) from “friendly” into “other/their-our” with further perspective to transform them into “others/outsiders” (Shvydko 2020).

In this context, the “case of Sheremet”, the journalist who worked in Belarus, the RF and Ukraine and was killed in the centre of Kyiv on 20.07.2016 in the result of the explosion of his car, is very demonstrative. The participation of President of Ukraine V. Zelensky and Attorney General R. Riaboshapka in extraordinary briefing on 12.12.2019 devoted to the arrest on suspicion of the killing is also demonstrative. That was a every reason on 13.12.2019 to raise suspicion to the people who were well-known among volunteers and ATO participants: Yana Dugar, volunteer, army doctor, junior sergeant, Joint Forces Operation participant; Yulia Kuzmenko, paediatric cardiosurgeon, volunteer, public figure; Andrew Antonenko, musician, sergeant, Joint Forces Operation participant. Demonstrative are the attempt to discredit the Revolution of Dignity events and Russian-Ukrainian conflict by: 1) spreading of information about the falsification in the list of “Heaven’s Hundred”; 2) amnesty for the representatives of power structure who opened fire at protesters in Maidan; 3) disfiguration and interpretation of the events in Maidan 2013-2014 as coup d’etat; 4) government initiatives to reconcile with the RF; 5) accenting
of attention on military confrontation as a civil conflict; 6) spreading of ideas as to the necessity for Ukraine to set off losses to the population of so-called LPR-DPR (Bratuschak 2020).

5. Conclusions

Russian-Ukrainian war proves that the basis for the existence of “otherness” in the society is the geographical bordering and belonging to different social times. Coexistence of different groups of “others” leads to the obtaining of new, previously unknown, means and forms of social life.

The fact that these social groups identify themselves with different territorial and time spaces not only divide into layers the social context as a symbolic projection of time-and-space dimension of the reality, but also make bases for conflicts by means of convergence of regulator used in “the main society”. All these determine a few situations. Firstly, this is the occasion when a social group appears simultaneously in several social subsystems submitting to the official norms and principles, adopted by the state, and living according to the rules of their society. Secondly, this is the situation when social rules of “others” and norms of public government don’t contradict with each other in generally valid aspects, such a situation is convenient for all the subjects of political process, and this community being a part of united society doesn’t seek for temporary and dimensional separation as well as the recognition of its autonomy. Thirdly, this is the situation of conflict (evident or latent). In that case any attempt to leave the forced public government will be seen by the group of “others” as a chance to find freedom and independence.

All these peculiarities have been used by the RF, which is an aggressive country, in Russian-Ukrainian conflict (since 2014 up to nowdays).

All mentioned above is the evidence of the fact that the Russian-Ukrainian war intentionally changes not only demographic composition of population in the Crimean and on occupied territories of Donbas but also changes the grounds for distinguishing into “friendly” and “alien” as well as different kinds of “others”, transforming the correlation of people and territory of a certain country and times (the present and the past).

Subdivision of society into “others” might be used by a country-aggressor as a potential information weapon not only through the asserting claims to the Ukrainian government but also through the potential opportunity to infiltrate their agents in the guise of migrants in order to propagate the accepting of “others/their our” by “others/outsiders”.

For occupied territories such identification processes may become the ground for strengthening of fear for citizens of the Crimea and so-called LPR-DPR, who remained to live in occupation because of different reasons, to be reintegrated into Ukraine.

It is important to take into consideration that modern Ukrainian politicians and managers are interested in making of different kinds of “others” on the non-occupied territory of Ukraine. For them the existence of war heroes cast doubt on the appropriateness of their political and management activity directed on the use of money as a political instrument to control budget flows, with help of which market monopolization and poverty of population transform into necessary requirement for system reproduction.
References