Governing AI Agents in National Defense: From Strategic Autonomy to Accountable Decision Architectures

Abstract

This paper examines the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) agents into national defense strategies, focusing on their role in strategic planning, intelligence analysis, logistics optimization, and decision support systems. Moving beyond the narrow debate on lethal autonomous weapons, the study conceptualizes AI agents as governance instruments that reshape command structures, civil–military relations, and strategic autonomy. Using a policy analysis framework, the paper explores how AI agents alter the speed, scale, and opacity of defense decision-making, generating both operational advantages and systemic risks. The analysis identifies three critical policy tensions: (i) autonomy versus human oversight in strategic and operational decisions, (ii) efficiency gains versus accountability and democratic control, and (iii) national security imperatives versus international norms and escalation risks. The paper proposes a layered governance model for defense AI agents, combining human-in-the-loop mandates, algorithmic auditability, and constitutional alignment of military AI use. The contribution lies in reframing AI agents not merely as technological assets, but as strategic actors embedded in institutional and legal architectures, requiring explicit policy design to preserve civilian control, strategic stability, and democratic legitimacy in an AI augmented defense ecosystem.

 Keywords: Artificial intelligence agents; defense policy; military decision-making; strategic autonomy; civil–military relations; national security strategy; defense innovation